Imaginary interview with Pope Leo XIV on the encyclical 'Magnifica Humanitas' dedicated to AI
What follows is a declared editorial exercise: a simulated interview constructed entirely from the contents of the encyclical *Magnifica Humanitas, published by the Holy See on May 25, 2026. Every response attributed to Pope Leo XIV is faithful, in content and meaning, to the original text, with explicit reference to the chapter and paragraph of origin. The purpose is to make a long and complex document more accessible to anyone involved in AI policies, technological ethics, or the social impact of digital technology, regardless of religious affiliation. For the full text and official reference, please refer to the document published by the Holy See. The numbers at the foot of the responses follow the references to the original document.*
The general framework
The title of the encyclical is Magnifica Humanitas, "magnificent humanity." Yet the document opens with a choice: either we build something great together, or we build a new Tower of Babel. What, in a nutshell, is the central message?
The choice I describe in the opening is more radical than it seems. It is not about choosing between technology "yes" or technology "no." It is about deciding what we want to build, and for whom. Every generation inherits the task of shaping its own time, of safeguarding the dignity of every person, of promoting justice, of making fraternity possible. But over every era also hangs the opposite risk: building an inhuman and more unjust world. This is the point: technology does not resolve this dilemma on its own; it sharpens it.
Introduction, §1
Why choose AI specifically as the subject of an encyclical? It is unusual territory for a papal document.
It is not unusual if one looks at history. This document is placed on the 135th anniversary of the Rerum novarum of 1891, with which Leo XIII addressed the labor issue and the transformations of the first industrialization. Even then, there were those who said that the Church should not deal with "worldly matters." He responded with realism: the proclamation of values cannot forget the concrete life of peoples. Today we find ourselves in an analogous situation, but of new proportions. Digitization, artificial intelligence, and robotics are transforming our world with unprecedented speed and pervasiveness. They are woven into the fabric of daily life, shaping decision-making processes and deeply affecting the collective imagination. As I write in the document, never has humanity had so much power over itself. We cannot remain silent before this.
Introduction, §§3–4
What does it mean, concretely, to "put the human person back at the center" in an era of intelligent technologies?
It means refusing to let the measure of progress become efficiency. It means recognizing that automation and optimization are tools, not ends. It means remembering that no technological innovation can be evaluated only in terms of performance, speed, or profit, but must always be measured against the dignity of each individual and the good of peoples. There is a risk I call the "Babel syndrome" in the document: the uniformity that flattens differences, the claim of a single language—even a digital one—capable of translating everything, even the mystery of the person, into data and performance. Putting the person at the center means stopping building systems in which the human being is reduced to a variable in an equation.
Introduction, §§10, 12
The encyclical insists heavily on a formula that will sound familiar to technical people: technology is not neutral. In what sense?
In a very precise and non-trivial sense. In the abstract, technology is in itself neither a solution nor an evil. But concretely, it is not neutral because it takes on the face of those who conceive it, fund it, regulate it, and use it. It is not a force of nature: it is a human choice, sedimented in code, in architectures, in business models. Every AI system carries with it the values, priorities, and interests of those who designed it and those who control it. To ignore this means to abdicate any discernment. That is why the crucial question is not "does it work?" but "does it work for whom, and under what conditions?".
Introduction, §9
What is the relationship between technological innovation and human dignity? Are they in structural tension?
Not necessarily. Technology has been rooted in human history from the beginning; it is a deeply human fact, linked to human autonomy and freedom. Technological development has contributed over the centuries to a significant improvement in humanity's living conditions. The problem is not innovation in itself, but that every phase of progress has also shown an ambiguous face: tools capable of causing harm when not oriented toward the good. Human dignity is not threatened by technology as such, but by that version of it that seeks to "correct" human fragility as if it were a system error, or that models man on the image of the machine rather than the other way around. True fulfillment does not come from the removal of fragility, but from a harmonious growth in which freedom and responsibility are intertwined with mutual care.
Introduction, §§4, 12
In the tech debate, the idea has circulated for years that AI is the first step toward overcoming the human: smarter, longer-lived, perhaps immortal. Does the encyclical take a stand on this?
Yes, and clearly. The document devotes a specific section to the narratives of transhumanism and posthumanism, which present the unlimited enhancement of the human being as a desirable horizon. The critique is not of a technical order, but an anthropological one: these visions treat fragility, limitation, and vulnerability as defects to be corrected, as bugs in a system that could be updated. The document challenges this premise at its root. Limitation is not a design error of the human: it is a constitutive part of its greatness. An idea of progress that aims to eliminate fragility ends up also eliminating what makes mutual care, dependence, and relationship possible. And these are exactly the dimensions that no artificial system will ever be able to replicate.
Chap. 3, sections "Underlying Narratives: Transhumanism and Posthumanism", "The Limit, the Heart, the Greatness of the Human Being"
Work and society
The encyclical devotes ample space to work. Why is the knot of work so central in a document on AI?
Because work is not just a means of obtaining income. It is a fundamental good for the person, in which the human being puts their own freedom and creativity into play, contributing to the cultural and moral elevation of society. The social Magisterium from Leo XIII onwards has consistently elaborated this principle: the primacy of human work over any purely productive or financial logic. Today this principle is being tested in an unprecedented way. Various forms of precariousness, the fragmentation of professional paths, and automation cannot be evaluated only in terms of efficiency, but starting from the dignity of the worker, the right to a sufficient wage, and the effective possibility of participating in social life. If the industrial revolution posed the labor question, the digital revolution poses an analogous question today.
Chap. 1, §37 (with reference to Laborem exercens); Chap. 4, section "The Dignity of Work in the Digital Transition"
What concrete risks do you see for workers in extreme automation and the massive use of AI?
The main risk is not just technical unemployment, the loss of jobs in the strict sense. It is something deeper: the commodification of the working person, their reduction to a variable cost to be optimized. A system that measures wages only on performance and not on the person, that selects and discards workers with the same logic with which it updates software, betrays the fundamental principle that a just wage is the concrete verification of the fairness of the entire socio-economic system. The text explicitly states that various forms of precariousness and automation cannot be evaluated only in terms of efficiency, but must always start from the dignity of the worker. The problem is not that machines are fast; it is that they are used to justify the compression of rights.
There is then a dimension that the document forcefully spells out and that is often missing from the technical debate: the link between work precariousness and the ability of new generations to build life projects. A society in which work is fragmented, uncertain, and replaceable by automation without adequate redistribution mechanisms is a society in which young people and families cannot plan for the future. The document addresses this link explicitly in the subsection dedicated to family and youth as "social conditions of hope": the crisis of work is not just economic; it is a crisis of perspective.
Chap. 1, §37; Chap. 4, sections "The Problem of Unemployment", "Family and Youth: Social Conditions of Hope"
How does the concept of progress change if it is measured only by efficiency?
It is completely deformed. Progress measured only by efficiency produces what we might call growth that "leaves behind" entire peoples—models of well-being that work for some and dump the costs on others. It is the technocratic paradigm: the implicit conviction that every problem is solvable with more technology, more optimization, more automation. But as I write in the document, this type of progress risks exacerbating inequalities, proposing immediate solutions incapable of healing the wounds of peoples. Authentic progress is measured by the dignity of each person. Without this criterion, it is not progress: it is distributive efficiency gone mad.
Introduction, §12; Chap. 3, section "The Technocratic Paradigm and Digital Power"
Power and governance
One of the most recurring themes in the encyclical is the concentration of technological power in a few hands. What is the specific problem?
It is a problem of structure, not of intentions. In the past, it was primarily States that guided and directed innovation. Today, the main drivers of development are private actors, often transnational, equipped with resources and intervention capabilities superior to those of many governments. Technological power thus takes on a predominantly "private" face, and for this reason, it is even harder to discern, govern, and orient toward the common good. The document echoes the words of Pope Francis: those who hold knowledge and especially the economic power to exploit it exercise an impressive dominion over the whole of the human race. It is not a matter of demonizing tech companies, but of acknowledging that private power without adequate public counterweights is a structural governance problem.
Introduction, §5
What responsibilities do companies, governments, and public institutions have, according to the encyclical?
Everyone has their own "stretch of wall" to rebuild, to use the image from the Book of Nehemiah that opens the document. The text indicates a distributed co-responsibility: scientists and researchers, entrepreneurs and workers, educators and legislators, civil society. No single hand is sufficient. But co-responsibility cannot be used as an alibi for lack of accountability. The criteria for discernment proposed by the document are explicit: responsible design, human and social impact assessments, inclusion of the most vulnerable, digital literacy, and research and industry oriented toward justice. These are not abstract principles: they are concrete requests addressed to those who make decisions on how AI systems are designed, funded, and regulated.
Introduction, §§13–14
Does the encyclical call for stronger rules for AI?
Yes, but with an important clarification. The document explicitly affirms the need to adopt adequate regulatory instruments capable of protecting justice and containing the distorting effects of technological power. But it immediately adds that the issue is not exhausted by regulation. Rules are necessary but insufficient if not accompanied by a deeper discernment of ends: who holds this power, and toward what ends do they orient it? The text is explicit about the link between transparency and responsibility: AI systems must be capable of being understood, evaluated, and contested. An opaque architecture is not just a technical problem; it is a power problem. Those who cannot see how a system that concerns them works cannot exercise any real control over it. Regulation without transparency is a paper dam.
Introduction, §§5, 14; Chap. 3, section "Responsibility, Transparency, and Governance of AI"
How do you regulate innovation without stifling its drive?
Through the principle of subsidiarity, which the document strongly recalls within the tradition of social doctrine. It means valuing cooperation between generations, between peoples, between disciplines and cultures. It means not concentrating the governance of innovation at a single institutional level. It means recognizing that associations, civil society, workers, and local communities must have a voice in the processes that concern them. Innovation is not stifled by regulation; it is stifled when regulation is asymmetric, designed to protect large actors and not people. The correct logic is not "fewer rules to innovate more," but "better rules that distribute benefits and risks fairly."
Chap. 1, §31; Introduction, §§13–14
Truth and freedom
The encyclical devotes an entire section to "truth as a common good." In a digital ecosystem dominated by artificially generated content, what does it mean to defend the truth?
It means recognizing that truth is not just an epistemic issue, but a political and social one. An information ecosystem in which manipulation is systematic and convenient, in which artificially generated content makes the real indistinguishable from the fabricated, does not just damage the quality of information: it erodes the foundations of democracy. Truth and democracy are linked. A democratic system presupposes that citizens can form a judgment based on verifiable facts. When this possibility is systematically compromised, political freedom becomes formal. The document speaks explicitly of the need for an ecology of communication and educational alliances for the digital age, with a central role assigned to schools.
Cap. 4, sections "Truth as a Common Good", "Truth and Democracy", "For an Ecology of Communication"
What specific dangers does the text see in information manipulation and digital deception?
The text frames them within a broader problem called the "collective imagination": emerging technologies do not only change what we know, but what we imagine, what we expect, what we consider normal. The pervasiveness of AI systems in the production and distribution of content deeply modifies this imagination, often in an invisible way. Artificial disinformation is not just a problem of incorrect facts: it is a tool for manipulating public opinion, weakening critical thinking, and eroding the ability of citizens to distinguish between arguments and propaganda. The document places this analysis in the section on communication and the collective imagination, treating it as one of the structural challenges of the era.
Cap. 4, sections "Communication and the Collective Imagination", "For an Ecology of Communication"
In what way can AI influence freedom, conscience, and critical judgment?
The text addresses this dimension in the section dedicated to safeguarding freedom against addiction and commodification. AI systems designed to maximize engagement, to direct attention, to build information bubbles, do not operate neutrally with respect to people's freedom. They create dependencies, orient choices, and condition preferences. The document uses strong expressions: "addictions and social control," "new slaveries." It is not about condemning technology, but about recognizing that certain business models, certain product designs, and certain algorithms are designed to systematically erode the ability of people to exercise autonomous critical judgment. Authentic freedom requires that technologies be designed to enhance human faculties, not to capture them.
Cap. 4, section "Safeguarding Freedom Against Addiction and Commodification", subsections "Addictions and Social Control", "Breaking the Chains of New Slaveries"
War and global responsibility
Why does an encyclical on AI enter the theme of peace and war? Doesn't it seem like a thematic leap?
It is not at all. AI is already deeply integrated into the military and strategic systems of the great powers. To ignore this would be to talk about AI as if it existed only in its commercial and civil version. The document devotes an entire chapter to what I call "the culture of power," which stands in contrast to the "civilization of love." The normalization of war, the idea that force has no limits, the crisis of multilateralism: these are trends that AI accelerates and amplifies. It is not the cause of everything, but it multiplies offensive capabilities, lowers escalation thresholds, and shifts the decision-making center toward autonomous systems. The text cannot afford to ignore this.
Chap. 5, section "The Culture of Power", subsections "The Normalization of War", "Weapons and Artificial Intelligence"
What is the specific risk of a military or strategic use of intelligent technologies?
The document explicitly addresses the issue of weapons and AI. The risk it identifies has to do with the compression of human decision-making space: increasingly autonomous systems operating in conflict scenarios, where the speed of calculation exceeds that of human judgment. But there is also a second-level risk: the normalization of war as a policy option, made more acceptable by the illusion that autonomous systems can contain collateral damage. The document criticizes what it calls a "presumptive political realism" that ends up building theoretical justifications for force without limits. AI does not make war cleaner: it lowers the thresholds for entry and multiplies its destructiveness.
Chap. 5, subsections "Weapons and Artificial Intelligence", "Force Without Limits", "A Presumptive Political Realism"
What does "common good" mean concretely in the era of AI?
It means that the benefits of artificial intelligence must be distributed to the entire human family, not accumulated by those who already have the power to design and control it. The document recalls the principle of the universal destination of goods: the fruits of the earth and of human labor belong in principle to all. This also applies to the "cognitive labor" that has fed AI models, it applies to digital infrastructure, it applies to data. The common good in the era of AI requires that technological governance be conceived as global and participatory governance, not as an agreement between a few technological powers. The crisis of multilateralism that the document denounces is also a crisis of the ability to govern technologies for the interest of all.
Chap. 5, section "Building the Civilization of Love", subsection "The Crisis of Multilateralism"; Chap. 2, section "The Principle of the Common Good"
Interpretative closing
Does the encyclical offer a rejection of technology or a criterion for using it better? How should it be read?
It should be read as a criterion, not as a rejection. I say this clearly in the document: technology can heal, connect, educate, and safeguard the common home. It is not in itself an evil. The problem is when the trajectory of technological development is determined only by those who have the economic power to impose it, without there being a collective discernment of ends. The document does not say "stop AI." It says: who decides where it goes, who controls its benefits and distributes its risks, what values are incorporated into the systems, who is included and who is discarded? These are questions that cannot be delegated only to the market or to those who invest billions in development. They require a shared, structured, institutional responsibility.
Introduction, §9; Introduction, §§13–14; Chap. 3, section "Responsibility, Transparency, and Governance of AI"
In summary, what should be the ethical compass for the development of AI?
The document offers precise, not generic, criteria. The dignity of the person: every AI system must be evaluable based on the impact it has on the dignity of the individuals and communities it touches. The universal destination of goods: benefits cannot be further concentrated. The option for the most vulnerable: when a system produces winners and losers, priority goes to those who lose. Care for the common home: digital infrastructures have an environmental impact that cannot be ignored. Peace: no technological development that accelerates the arms race or lowers the thresholds of conflict can be said to be oriented toward the good. And transparency and responsibility in the governance of systems: without these, all other criteria remain statements of intent. It is not a list of prohibitions: it is a compass for those who design, those who regulate, and those who decide.
Introduction, §14; Chap. 3, section "Responsibility, Transparency, and Governance of AI"; Chap. 2, section "The Principles of Social Doctrine"
The full text of the encyclical Magnifica Humanitas is available on the Holy See website in several languages, including Italian.